Photonic quantum data locking by Huang, Zixin et al.
Boson Sampling Private-Key Quantum Cryptography
Zixin Huang,1, ∗ Peter P. Rohde,2 Dominic W. Berry,3 Pieter Kok,1 Jonathan P. Dowling,4, 5, 6, 7 and Cosmo Lupo1, †
1Department of Physics & Astronomy, University of Sheffield, UK
2Centre for Quantum Software & Information (QSI),
Faculty of Engineering & Information Technology University of Technology Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia
3Department of Physics and Astronomy, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales 2113, Australia
4Hearne Institute for Theoretical Physics and Department of Physics & Astronomy,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803, USA
5National Institute of Information and Communications Technology,
4-2-1, Nukui-Kitamachi, Koganei, Tokyo 184-8795, Japan
6NYU-ECNU Institute of Physics at NYU Shanghai, Shanghai 200062, China
7CAS-Alibaba Quantum Computing Laboratory, USTC, Shanghai 201315, China
(Dated: May 9, 2019)
We introduce a quantum private-key encryption protocol based on multi-photon interference in
linear optics networks. The scheme builds upon Boson Sampling, and we show that it is hard to
break, even for a quantum computer. We present an information-theoretic proof of the security
of our protocol against an eavesdropper with unlimited (quantum) computational power but time-
limited quantum storage. This protocol is shown to be optimal in the sense that it asymptotically
encrypts all the information that passes through the interferometer using an exponentially smaller
private key. This is the first practical application of Boson Sampling in quantum communication.
Our scheme requires only moderate photon numbers and is experimentally feasible with current
technology.
Private-key, or symmetric-key, encryption is the crypto-
graphic task of obfuscating data using a secret key and
sending it to a recipient who shares the key. An eaves-
dropper intercepting the transmission cannot decipher
the message without the key. Classically there is only one
such encryption protocol that provably exhibits perfect
information-theoretic security, namely the one-time pad
[1]. However, the one-time pad is often impractical since
the secret key must be as long as the message and can
never be reused, leading to significant bandwidth require-
ments. Quantum key distribution [2, 3] (QKD), most no-
tably the BB84 protocol [4], enables the secret sharing of
random bit-strings, which can subsequently be employed
in a one-time pad. QKD therefore seems to inherit the
impracticalities of the classical one-time pad. Classically,
private-key protocols with keys that are short compared
to the message length suffer from a lack of strong com-
plexity proofs for their security [5, 6]. Short private-key
quantum communication protocols exist, using the phe-
nomenon of Quantum Data Locking (QDL) [7–10]. Here,
we propose Boson Sampling as a practical, efficient imple-
mentation of QDL for short private-key quantum commu-
nication, and we prove its security against an eavesdrop-
per who may have a quantum computer, but does not
possess perfect quantum storage. This is the first direct
practical application of Boson Sampling for a quantum
information processing task.
Boson Sampling is the problem of sampling from a
specific ensemble, namely, the one generated by a pas-
sive linear optical interferometer fed with single-photon
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inputs [11, 12]. A strong advantage of using a Boson
Sampling device is that an exponentially large Hilbert
space can be arrived at using only a polynomial number
of photons and optical modes. It has been shown that
such devices generate a large amount of number-path en-
tanglement [13], a fact that has inspired applications in
quantum metrology [13, 14] and quantum chemistry [15].
Here we show that this entanglement can be exploited
directly in quantum cryptography, since the exponential
number of basis states in the number-path degrees of free-
dom makes it very difficult for an eavesdropper to obtain
information about the state. Given that the generation
and detection of single photons have become standard-
ised and relatively straightforward to implement in the
lab (see for example Refs. [16–21]), our scheme serves as
a practical new protocol for efficient quantum cryptogra-
phy with near-term technology.
We present the first information-theoretic proof of the
security of Boson Sampling as a quantum public-key
cryptography protocol under the assumption that Eve
has access to a quantum computer, but not to perfect
quantum storage technology. Imperfect quantum stor-
age is a common assumption in a number of quantum
cryptographic protocols, including the Bounded Quan-
tum Storage Model, [22], the Noisy Storage Model [23]
(see also Ref. [24]), and QDL [25–27]. It states that Eve
cannot store unlimited amounts of quantum information
for an unlimited time with unit fidelity. This assump-
tion is valid in the near to medium term, when quantum
storage technologies do not meet Eve’s needs. Under this
assumption, all of the above protocols are known to guar-
antee composable security [28]. The number of photons
required for communication security in our protocol is
much smaller than the number of photons that render
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2Boson Sampling intractable on classical computers.
In this Letter, we first describe the task of Boson Sam-
pling and how it leads to our quantum communication
protocol. Next, we provide some intuition for the secu-
rity of the protocol and introduce the QDL technique.
We sketch the security proof for a noiseless communica-
tion channel and extend it to noisy channels. Finally, we
show how loss and noise affect the secure communication
rate and how error correction can be included without
having to re-derive the security bounds.
Boson Sampling:— Boson Sampling is a non-universal
model for quantum computing that involves taking sam-
ples of a multimode interferometer, where the inputs are
single-photon Fock states. Let n photons be sent into
m optical modes of an interferometer with at most one
photon per input mode. The input modes aˆ evolve uni-
tarily into output modes U aˆU†, with U the linear optical
transformation describing the interferometer. Aaronson
and Arkhipov showed that when m  n2, simulating a
sample of the photon distribution at the output (even
approximately) is computationally difficult for a classi-
cal computer given reasonable complexity-theoretic as-
sumptions [11]. Based on the most recent simulation
algorithms [29], a value of n < 100 is likely sufficient
to surpass the point at which the sampling problem is
tractable on classical computers. The output from the
interferometer prior to photo-detection can be expanded
in the photon number basis:
|ψout〉 =
∑
n
λn |n1, ...., nm〉 , (1)
where n = (n1, ...., nm) denotes a photon-number con-
figuration with ni photons in the ith mode and λn its
amplitude. Moreover,
∑
i ni = n. The boson sampling
task is to generate a sample from the distribution induced
by {λn}. This can be done by a classical computer when
the λn are known. However, calculating {λn} given U
and an n-photon input state approximates calculating
the permanent of a random n × n matrix of [30], which
is known to be #P-complete on a classical computer.
Protocol:— Alice and Bob aim to communicate in se-
cret, while Eve attempts to eavesdrop on them. Our
protocol consists of the following steps (see Fig. 1), and
the proof of the security is based on a random coding
technique (all logs are of base 2):
1. The code words |ψj〉 are chosen randomly from the
M =
(
m
n
)
possible permutations of n photons over
m modes. The number of code words is M ′ = δM ,
where 0 < δ < 1 is a constant. For δ  1 Alice
is encoding about logM − O(log (1/δ)) bits of in-
formation. Note that the overall dimension of the
Hilbert space (including states with multiple pho-
tons in one mode) is d =
(
m+n−1
n
)
.
2. Alice and Bob share a short unconditionally secure
key of length logK bits, obtained for example using
BB84.
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FIG. 1. Circuit layout for the encryption protocol. The code
words |ψj〉 are chosen from the
(
m
n
)
possible permutations of
n photons in m modes. Alice and Bob share a secret key
in advance, which Alice uses to encode her binary photonic
input message via a random unitary U . Bob decodes using
the inverse operation U−1.
3. In advance, but not necessarily in secret, Alice and
Bob agree upon a set of K Haar-random m × m
unitary matrices, {Uk}.
4. To encrypt the input code word, Alice applies the
linear-optical network corresponding to the unique
unitary Uk associated with the secret key.
5. Bob, who knows the secret key, applies U−1k and
measures the output photon number distribution
(it is sufficient to use on-off detectors for this task).
This should match |ψj〉, the unencrypted code word
sent by Alice.
The code space can be very large, leading to an efficient
communication protocol. Eve does not have access to Uk,
from which the security of the encryption arises.
We have presented an abstract protocol that can be
implemented using any physical degrees of freedom. It is
natural to implement the scheme using an interferometer
with m spatial modes, however, for long-range transmis-
sion, a time-bin encoded approach [31, 32] could aid to
reduce phase fluctuations.
Security:— We first provide some intuition into the se-
curity of the protocol. Eve intercepts the encrypted mes-
sage and measures non-destructively to infer the code
word. If she chooses a random unitary V ∈ {Uk}, the
effective evolution of encryption followed by an eaves-
dropping attempt would be given by V †Uk. The prob-
ability of obtaining the guess |ψj′〉 given the code word
|ψj〉 is Pjj′ = | 〈ψj′ |V †Uk|ψj〉 |2, which can be expressed
in terms of a matrix permanent and is classically hard to
compute (#P-complete).
In contrast to classical encryption techniques, where
brute-force attacks are possible in principle, here the
no-cloning theorem forbids the replication of arbitrary
unknown states. Thus for each code word transmission
Eve has only one attempt to infer the message from the
cipher-text. Collapsing the state in Eq. (1) will cause
errors in Bob’s decoding and will reveal Eve’s presence.
Our claim is that even if Eve is endowed with a quantum
computer, her opportunity to eavesdrop is obstructed.
3Our assumptions are that the initial secret key remains
secret to Eve, at least up to the point where she makes the
measurement, and she does not have a quantum memory
that can hold the state for indefinite time. These as-
sumptions are identical to those of QDL, and it is there-
fore natural to use QDL as a theoretical tool to prove the
security of our protocol.
Quantum Data Locking:— The Quantum Data Lock-
ing (QDL) effect is a uniquely quantum phenomenon that
separates classical and quantum information theory [7–
9]. When a classical message is encoded into a quantum
state, it requires a much shorter key to completely scram-
ble the information, such that the number of bits obtain-
able by Eve can be made arbitrarily small. The trusted
parties, Alice and Bob, use a short shared secret key of
logK bits to select a set of M code words that they use to
send information. Previous works have established a the-
ory of a quantum enigma machine [25, 26, 33–36] that ex-
ploits QDL for key distribution and direct secret commu-
nication over a quantum communication channel. Here
we show that multi-photon interference in the regime of
Boson Sampling enhances the secret key efficiency.
Sketch of security proof:— Alice randomly prepares
one of the d-dimensional vectors |ψj〉 and scrambles it
by applying one of the unitary transformations Uk. Since
Eve does not have access to the secret key, her description
of the state is the statistical mixture
ρAE =
1
M ′
M ′∑
j=1
|j〉A 〈j| ⊗
1
K
K∑
k=1
Uk |ψj〉E 〈ψj |U†k , (2)
where |j〉 denotes Alice’s record of the code word she sent
to Bob (and intercepted by Eve). We assess the security
via the accessible information Iacc(A;E), which quanti-
fies the information that Eve can extract by measuring
the quantum state [7, 8]. When A is the random vari-
able representing the distribution of code words and E is
the random variable associated with Eve’s measurement
outcomes, this becomes
Iacc(A;E) = maxME
[H(A) +H(E)−H(A,E)] , (3)
where H(X) is the Shannon entropy of the random vari-
able X, and the maximization is over Eve’s measure-
ments ME . Using the accessible information implicitly
assumes that Eve must measure her share of the quan-
tum system after a given time [27]. This is the same
assumption underlying our Boson Sampling communica-
tion protocol.
Eve’s best measurement for extracting information
about the code words takes the form of a rank-one
POVM {αy |φy〉 〈φy|}y [7], with the |φy〉 possibly non-
orthogonal and αy the normalisations that ensure the
POVM elements sum to the identity. This POVM leads
to the probability distributions pE(y) = αy 〈φy|ρE |φy〉
and pE|j(y) = αy 〈φy|ρE|j |φy〉, where ρE is Eve’s
reduced density matrix obtained from Eq. (2), and
ρE|j =
∑
kK
−1Uk |ψj〉E 〈ψj |U†k is Eve’s reduced density
matrix given a specific choice for j. The accessible infor-
mation can then be written as (see Supplemental Mate-
rial)
Iacc(A;E) ∼ H(pE)− 1
M ′
M ′∑
j=1
H(pE|j) . (4)
To demonstrate the security of the protocol we show that
Iacc(A;E) can be made arbitrarily small for finite mes-
sage size if M ′ and K are large enough. The proof is
based on the fact that by increasing K both pE and pE|j
concentrate towards their common average µ, and the
probability of a deviation larger than µ is exponentially
suppressed. Therefore both the entropy H(pE) and the
conditional entropy 1M ′
∑M ′
j=1H(pE|j) will tend to the
same value. The conclusion is that for any  > 0 the
probability of Iacc(A;E) >  log (1/µ) is exponentially
suppressed in K. In the Supplemental Material we deter-
mine the required size of the initial secret key K, which in
turn allows us to compute the net secure communication
rate per photon and per channel use.
Noiseless channels in the m  n2 limit:— First con-
sider an ideal scenario in which Alice and Bob can com-
municate via a perfect, noiseless channel. Moreover con-
sider for now the regime of m  n2 (note that this is
the regime in which Boson Sampling has been first intro-
duced). As Alice and Bob initially shared a key of logK
bits, the net information gain of the protocol is
R = logM − logK −O(log (1/δ)) . (5)
We find that the accessible information can be made -
small if the number K of different scrambling unitaries
is chosen such that (γ is defined below)
logK = log γ + log
d
M
+O
(
log
1

)
. (6)
The coefficient γ characterizes the statistics of the ran-
dom variable XU = |〈φ|U |ψj〉|2 . Note that, for given φ
and ψ, XU is a random variable because is a function of
the random unitary U . We define
γ :=
EU [X2U ]
EU [XU ]2
, (7)
where EU denotes the expectation value over the choice
of the unitary U (recall that the unitaries are sampled
from the uniform distribution). Note that γ quantifies
the spread of the random variable around its expectation
value. The more XU is narrowly concentrated around its
mean, the smaller the private key.
The coefficient γ can be computed analytically in the
limit of m  n2, where photon-bunching is statistically
suppressed. Note that XU is a polynomial of degree 2n
in the matrix elements of U , and in this limit it takes the
form of the permanent of a random n× n sub-matrix of
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FIG. 2. The number of transmitted bits log δM, δ = 0.01,
and the secret key consumption logK. For m = n3, code
words logM (blue solid line), secret key size logK for dif-
ferent security parameters,  = exp(−ns ln 2), with s = 0.5
(red dashed), s = 1 (purple dotted), and for fixed  = 10−10
(green dotted dashed). If we choose the security parameter
 ∝ exp(−ns ln 2),  logM → 0 as n→∞.
U . The elements of the sub-matrix are effectively inde-
pendent when m is sufficiently large. Using this approxi-
mation, we can analytically calculate the moments of XU
with respect to the uniform Haar measure over unitary
matrices:
EU [XU ] =
n!
mn
, EU [X2U ] ≤
2n!(n+ 1)!
m2n
. (8)
Therefore γ ≤ 2(n+1) and we can estimate explicitly how
many unitaries are needed for secure encryption from Eq.
(6), which only grows logarithmically with the number of
photons plus a constant overhead.
Using the Stirling approximation we obtain, for m 
n2  1:
R ' n log m
n
− log n− log d
M
−O
(
log
1
δ
)
. (9)
This explicitly shows that the net information gain is
exponentially larger than the secret key shared initially.
This is the first key result of this Letter and it allows
us to compute the net information gain of the protocol
using Eq. (5): examples are shown in Fig. 2.
Practical protocols:— A practical communication pro-
tocol needs to be defined in the finite-size regime where
the number of photons and mode are kept relatively
small. Moreover, the presence of loss and noise in the
communication channel necessitates the use of some form
of error correction, which exploits redundancy in the pro-
tocol. This redundancy can in principle be used by Eve
to learn more about the secret message, and one may ex-
pect that new security proofs have to be constructed for
each new error correction code. Here we address these
two issues and show that the structure of our proof en-
compasses a large class of error correcting protocols and
can be also adapted to the finite-size regime.
Consider first the issue of finite photon numbers. If
the number of photons and modes (per signal transmis-
sion) is kept small, and if the number of modes m is not
necessarily larger than n2, we cannot apply the boson
birthday paradox [11]. This means that we need to ex-
plicitly account for photon bunching. This will have an
effect on our estimation of the γ factor in Eq. (7). In
particular, the moments of the random variable XU =
|〈φ|U |ψj〉|2 will now be functions of the vector φ. A
generic vector φ can be written as |φ〉 = ∑q,t αq,t|φq,t〉,
where q identifies a subspace with given photon occu-
pancy pattern, and t labels the computational basis vec-
tors within. For example, given two photons and three
modes, q = 1 corresponds to the single-occupancy space
S1 which is generated by the computational basis vectors
{|110〉, |101〉, |011〉}, and for q = 2 the double-occupancy
space S2 is generated by the computational basis vectors
{|200〉, |020〉, |002〉}. We can show (see Supplemental Ma-
terial) that the following bound holds independently of
the vector φ:
γ ≤ 2 max
q
γq , (10)
where
γq =
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψj〉|4]
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψj〉|2]2 . (11)
Note that by symmetry, the coefficients γq do not depend
on the particular choice of the vectors φq,t, nor on the
code word ψj . Therefore the above upper bound on γ is
feasible to be computed numerically.
Consider now using error correcting codes in the pres-
ence of loss and noise. The code words |ψj〉 can be
concatenated in a train of ν signals (i.e. making ν
uses of the channel), creating a new codeword |ψj〉 =
|ψj1〉 . . . |ψjν 〉 that incorporates error correction. The
scrambling unitary transformation Uk then takes the
form Uk = Uk1 · · ·Ukν , and Eve’s description of the state
is
ρAE =
1
Mν
∑
j
|j〉A 〈j| ⊗
1
K(ν)
∑
k
Uk |ψj〉E 〈ψj |U †k .
(12)
This expression is formally identical to the one in Eq. (2),
therefore the general proof method holds for the noisy
channel as well. The key consumption rate is then
1
ν
logK(ν) ' log (n+ 1) + log d
M
, (13)
where we have neglected a small term proportional to
1
νO(log (
−1δ−1)).
In the case of a noisy and lossy channel, the amount of
information that Alice and Bob can communicate per sig-
nal is quantified by the mutual information I(A;B) and
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FIG. 3. Net number of bits transmitted per channel use in
the presence of loss. The parameters are β = 0.95, δ = 0.01,
m,n = 20, 4 and  = exp(−νs ln 2), s = 0.43, where ν is the
number of channel use. The shaded region is a guide to the
eye only, and data points above the region denotes net positive
secret communication rate.
is in general strictly smaller than log
(
m
n
)
. The amount
of loss and noise in the communication channel can be
experimentally determined with the standard tools of pa-
rameter estimation, a routine commonly used in quantum
key distribution. This in turn allows Alice and Bob to
quantify I(A;B). In general an error correcting has only
finite efficiency β < 1, which in turn limits the amount
of data transmitted to βI(A;B). Putting this together
with the result obtained above, we obtain our estimate
for the net rate of the protocol:
r = βI(A;B)− log (n+ 1)− log d
M
. (14)
This is the second key result of this Letter: it shows that
Boson Sampling cryptography is feasible, scalable, and
robust to noise and loss.
We can compute explicitly I(A;B) for a pure loss chan-
nel with transmissivity η. The net key rate r is shown
in Fig. 3, for a few values of m,n = 20, 4. For example,
for m ' n2  1, we obtain I(A;B) ' η log n. Therefore
the net rate is r ' (βηn− 1) log n. This implies that one
can in principle achieve arbitrarily long distances (corre-
sponding to low transmissivity η) as long as n > (ηβ)−1.
Conclusion:— Several works have attempted to apply
the physical insights of Boson Sampling in a quantum
information framework beyond its defining problem. In
this paper we have presented the first successful quan-
tum communication result in this direction. We have
presented an information-theoretic proof that a linear-
optical interferometer operating in the Boson-Sampling
regime is useful for quantum cryptography. The security
proof is based on the Quantum Data Locking effect and
random coding techniques. Given n photons in m modes,
we have shown that one can lock about n log(m/n) bits
of classical information using a much shorter secret key
of only ∼ log n bits initially shared by the legitimate
parties Alice and Bob. The efficiency of our protocol is
therefore close to optimal. In addition, we have shown
that our protocol remains secure when we use classical
error correction to protect the channel against photon
loss and other errors. It is therefore a scalable and ef-
ficient protocol for quantum cryptography. In fact, in
contrast with Boson Sampling requiring the control of
a large number of modes and photons to demonstrate
a quantum advantage, our protocol is secure even for
small numbers of modes and photons. This means that,
given recent results in photon generation and advances
in integrated linear optics, our protocol is experimentally
feasible with currently available technology. In fact, this
protocol design may represent a viable approach to high-
rate quantum secured communication beyond standard
QKD.
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Appendix: Preliminary observations
Before presenting the security proof of the protocol, we will have a closer look at the state
ρ¯E := EU [U |ψ〉〈ψ|U†] =
∫
dU U |ψ〉〈ψ|U† , (A.1)
where ψ is a vector in the single-occupancy subspace, i.e., the linear span of all vectors with at most 1 photon per
mode (and a total of n photons). Note that by symmetry ρ¯E is independent of ψ.
We denote as P1 the projector into the single-occupancy space. Going beyond single-occupancy, we label with
an integer q all the other possible occupancy patterns. One examples is the subspace spanned by all states having
two photons in only one mode and at most one photon in the others. Another example is the subspace spanned
by those vectors having two modes with three photons in each mode, and at most one photon in the others. For a
given occupancy pattern q, we associate a corresponding projector Pq. By symmetry, the state ρ¯E is diagonal in the
projectors Pq’s, i.e.,
ρ¯E =
∑
q
cqPq . (A.2)
We are particularly interested in the minimum value:
cmin := min
q
cq , (A.3)
which can be computed numerically. Examples are shown in Table I. According to the Table, we conjecture that the
minimum is always achieved for the single-occupancy subspace. In the context of eavesdropping (discussed in the
next section), cq corresponds to the expectation values of measuring certain state with occupancy pattern q.
If the number of modes is much larger than the number of photons squared, m n2, the probability of occupancy
greater than 1 is suppressed. In this regime we can then write (see Section )
ρ¯E =
n!
mn
P1 , (A.4)
and therefore
cmin = cmax =
n!
mn
. (A.5)
The other quantity we are interested in is
γ = max
φ
EU [|〈φ|U |ψ〉|4]
EU [|〈φ|U |ψ〉|2]2 . (A.6)
In general γ can be estimated numerically, see Section . In the regime of m  n2 it can be instead computed
analytically as shown in Section .
In the following we will make repeated application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to bound the coefficient γ.
The application goes as follows. A generic state φ is expanded as the linear combination of basis vectors,
|φ〉 =
∑
i
λi|φi〉 . (A.7)
The basis vectors are chosen such that
EU
[〈φi|U |ψ〉〈ψ|U†|φi′〉] = δii′EU [|〈φi|U |ψ〉|2] , (A.8)
EU
[〈φi|U |ψ〉〈ψ|U†|φi′〉〈φi′′ |U |ψ〉〈ψ|U†|φi′′′〉] = δii′δi′′i′′′ + δii′′′δi′i′′
2δii′′
EU
[|〈φi|U |ψ〉|2|〈φi′′ |U |ψ〉|2] . (A.9)
Below we will expand our vectors in basis that, by symmetry, satisfy the above identities.
8(m,n) Photon occupancy pattern q cq n!/m
n
(6, 2) (1, 1, 0, . . . ) 0.0471 0.0556
(2, 0, . . . ) 0.0977
(10, 2) (1, 1, 0, . . . ) 0.0181 0.02
(2, 0, . . . ) 0.0369
(20, 2) (1, 1, 0, . . . ) 0.00476 0.005
(2, 0, 0, . . . ) 0.00959
(10, 3) (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 0.00451 0.006
(1, 2, 0, . . . ) 0.00914
(3, 0, . . . ) 0.0283
(20, 3) (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 0.000648 0.00075
(1, 2, 0, . . . ) 0.00131
(3, 0, . . . ) 0.00398
(20, 4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 0.000114 0.00015
(1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 0.000226
(2, 2, 0, . . . ) 0.000456
(1, 3, 0, . . . ) 0.00069
(4, 0, . . . ) 0.00285
TABLE I. The table shows numerical estimates of the coefficient cq for several number of photon and modes and patterns of
photon occupancy. The table also show the corresponding value of the coefficients n!/mn, which is relevant in the regime where
n2  m.
Under these conditions we obtain
EU [|〈φ|U |ψ〉|2] =
∑
i
λ2i EU [|〈φi|U |ψ〉|2] , (A.10)
and
EU [|〈φ|U |ψ〉|4] =
∑
i
|λi|4EU
[|〈φi|U |ψ〉|4]+ 2 ∑
i6=i′′
|λi|2|λi′′ |2EU
[|〈φi|U |ψ〉|2|〈φi′′ |U |ψ〉|2]
≤ 2
∑
ii′′
|λi|2|λi′′ |2EU
[|〈φi|U |ψ〉|2|〈φi′′ |U |ψ〉|2]
≤ 2
∑
ii′′
|λi|2|λi′′ |2
√
EU [|〈φi|U |ψ〉|4]E [〈φi′′ |U |ψ〉|4]
= 2
(∑
i
|λi|2
√
EU [|〈φi|U |ψ〉|4]
)2
, (A.11)
where the second inequality is an application of Cauchy-Schwarz.
In conclusion we obtain the upper bound
γ ≤ 2 max
φ
(∑
i |λi|2
√
EU [|〈φi|U |ψ〉|4]∑
i |λi|2EU [|〈φi|U |ψ〉|2]
)2
≤ 2 max
i
EU
[|〈φi|U |ψ〉|4]
EU [|〈φi|U |ψ〉|2]2
. (A.12)
Compared with the definition in Eq. (A.6) we now only need to consider the basis vectors φi. The expression in Eq.
(A.12) is therefore suitable to be evaluated numerically. Also note that the penalty to pay for this simplification is
the multiplication by a factor 2.
9Appendix: Overview of the security proof
Consider a system of n photons over m optical modes. The dimension of the associated Hilbert space is d =
(
n+m−1
n
)
,
which implies that log d is the maximum number of bits that the system can encode. For practical reasons, we consider
a communication protocol that only requires the sender Alice to prepare states with single-occupancy, i.e., states with
at most one photon per mode. If m > n there are a total of M =
(
m
n
)
such states, which we denote as |ψj〉, with
j = 1, 2, . . . ,M . For example, for m = 3 and n = 2 these states are {|110〉, |101〉, |011〉}.
We prove the security using a random-coding approach. This means that a code book of M ′ = δM vectors is
randomly chosen sampling from the basis states {|ψj〉}j=1,2,...,M , where 0 < δ < 1 is a constant. These M ′ code words
are denoted as {|ψx〉}x=1,2,...,M ′ . For δ  1, we expect that the M ′ code words are all distinct up to terms of second
order in δ. Therefore the M ′ code words encode about logM −O(log (1/δ)) bits of information.
The sender Alice first prepares a state |ψx〉, then applies a linear optics unitary Uk. The unitary is chosen among
a pool of K elements according to a secret key of logK bits that she shares with the receiver Bob. We recall that the
pool of unitaries is drawing K unitaries i.i.d. according to the uniform probability density distribution on the group
of m-mode linear optics unitary transformations. For an eavesdropper who does not know the secret key the state is
described by the density operator
ρxE =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U†k . (A.1)
Given the classical-quantum state
ρXE =
M ′∑
x=1
pX(x)|ψx〉〈ψx| ⊗ ρxE , (A.2)
Eve attempts to extract information from her share of the state by applying a measurement ME→Y . Such a mea-
surement is characterized by the POVM elements {αy|φy〉〈φy|}y , where φy’s are unit vectors and αy > 0 such that∑
y αy|φy〉〈φy| = I, with I the identity operator. Without loss of generality we can consider rank-one POVM only [7].
The output of this measurement is a random variable Y such that
pY (y) = αy
〈
φy
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M ′∑
x=1
pX(x)ρ
x
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣φy
〉
, (A.3)
and the conditional probability is
pY |X=x(y) = αy〈φy|ρxE |φy〉 , (A.4)
The accessible information is the maximum mutual information between X and Y :
Iacc(X;E) = sup
ME→Y
I(X;Y ) , (A.5)
where
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X)
=−
∑
y
pY (y) log pY (y) +
M ′∑
x=1
pX(x)
∑
y
pY |X=x(y) log [pY |X=x(y)]
=−
∑
y
αy
〈
φy
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M ′∑
x=1
pX(x)ρ
x
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣φy
〉
log
αy〈φy| M ′∑
x=1
pX(x)ρ
x
E |φy〉

+
M ′∑
x=1
pX(x)
∑
y
αy〈φy|ρxE |φy〉 log [αy〈φy|ρxE |φy〉] . (A.6)
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Putting for simplicity pX(x) = 1/M
′ we obtain
I(X;Y ) =
∑
y
αy
−
〈
φy
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M ′
M ′∑
x=1
ρxE
∣∣∣∣∣∣φy
〉
log
〈
φy
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M ′
M ′∑
x=1
ρxE
∣∣∣∣∣∣φy
〉
+
1
M ′
M ′∑
x=1
〈φy|ρxE |φy〉 log 〈φy|ρxE |φy〉
 . (A.7)
Note that the accessible information is written as the difference of two entropy-like quantities. The rationale of the
security proof is to show that for K large enough, and for random choice of the unitaries and of the code words, both
the first and second terms in the curly brackets are arbitrarily close to
−〈φy|ρ¯E |φy〉 log 〈φy|ρ¯E |φy〉 (A.8)
for all vectors φy, where ρ¯E is as in Eq. (A.1). This implies that the accessible information can be made in turn
arbitrarily small. To show this we exploit the phenomenon of concentration towards the average of the sum of i.i.d.
random variables. This concentration is quantified by concentration inequalities, also called tail bounds.
We now proceed along two parallel directions:
1. We apply the matrix Chernoff bound to show that 1M ′
∑M ′
x=1 ρ
x
E is close to ρ¯E . In particular the matrix Chernoff
bound implies that the inequality
1
M ′
M ′∑
x=1
ρxE ≤ (1 + )ρ¯E (A.9)
holds true with almost unit probability, and this probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1 if K is large
enough.
This in turn implies
−
〈
φ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M ′
M ′∑
x=1
ρxE
∣∣∣∣∣∣φ
〉
log
〈
φ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M ′
M ′∑
x=1
ρxE
∣∣∣∣∣∣φ
〉
≤ −(1 + )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log (1 + )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 (A.10)
≤ −(1 + )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 (A.11)
uniformly for all φ.
The details are presented in Section below.
2. We apply a tail bound from A. Maurer [37] to show that
〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 ≥ (1− )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 , (A.12)
with a probability that can be made arbitrarily close to 1 if K is large enough. The above is true for all unit
vectors φ and for almost all values of x. This in turn implies that
〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 ≤ (1− )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log (1− )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 . (A.13)
In conclusion we obtain that, up to a small probability,
1
M ′
M ′∑
x=1
〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 ≤ (1− )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log (1− )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 (A.14)
≤ (1− )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 . (A.15)
The details are presented in Section below.
Putting the above results in Eq. (A.11) and (A.15) into Eq. (A.7) we finally obtain
I(X;Y ) ≤ −2
∑
y
αy〈φy|ρ¯E |φy〉 log 〈φy|ρ¯E |φy〉 . (A.16)
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Recall that pY (y) = αy〈φy|ρ¯E |φy〉 is a probability distribution. Therefore, as the average is always smaller that the
maximum, we obtain
I(X;Y ) ≤ −2min
φ
log 〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 = 2 log 1
cmin
, (A.17)
where cmin := minφ〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 can be computed as discussed in Section .
The above bound on the accessible information is not deterministic, but the probability that it fails can be made
arbitrary small provided K is large enough. In particular we need to require (see Section below):
K > max
{
γ
[
256
3δ
d
M
log
(
20
cmin
)
+
32
2
log δM
]
,
32
2δ
(log 2d)2
Mcmin
}
. (A.18)
The size of K critically depends on the factor γ. This factor determines the convergence rate of the Maurer tail bound
and is given by:
γ = max
φ
EU [|〈φ|U |ψx〉|4]
EU [|〈φ|U |ψx〉|2]2 . (A.19)
How to estimate this coefficient is the subject of Sections and .
Appendix: Scaling the communication protocol up
In the previous section we have described the security proof having in mind a one-shot scenario where only one
signal is sent from Alice to Bob (one signal being composed of n photons in m modes).
In a practical communication scenario, not only one signal, but a large number of signals are sent from Alice to Bob.
An eavesdropper tampering with the communication line may gain additional information by exploiting correlations
between different signals. In this section we show how to rule out this possibility by a simple extension of the above
security proof from a one-signal to a multi-signal scenario.
Consider a train of ν  1 signal transmissions. Alice encodes information in code words of the form
|ψx〉 = |ψx1〉 ⊗ |ψx2〉 ⊗ . . . |ψxν 〉 , (A.1)
where each component ψx1 is chosen randomly and independently as discussed in Section . In this way a code book of
M ′ random vectors is defined. Each vector is a code word and is uniquely identified by a multi-index x = x1, x2, . . . , xν .
We put M ′ = δMν , where 0 < δ  1 is a small constant.
First Alice encodes information across ν signal transmissions using the code words ψx, then she applies local
unitaries to scramble it. These local unitaries are
Uk = Uk1 ⊗ Uk2 · · · ⊗ Ukν . (A.2)
The set of possible unitaries is made of K(ν) = Kν elements. As above, these unitaries are chosen by sampling
identically and independently from the distribution induced by the uniform measure on the unitary group of linear
optical passive unitary transformations. Note that, whereas ν is arbitrary large, the number of mode m in each signal
transmission is constant. Also, the number of photons per signal is fixed and equal to n.
The eavesdropper’s accessible information is then formally equivalent to the one in Eq. (A.7):
I(Xν ;Y ) =
∑
y
αy
−
〈
φy
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M ′
M ′∑
x=1
ρxE
∣∣∣∣∣∣φy
〉
log
〈
φy
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1M ′
M ′∑
x=1
ρxE
∣∣∣∣∣∣φy
〉
+
1
M ′
M ′∑
x=1
〈φy|ρxE |φy〉 log 〈φy|ρxE |φy〉
 , (A.3)
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where for each x = x1, x2, . . . , xν ,
ρxE =
Kν∑
k=1
Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U †k (A.4)
=
K∑
k1,k2,...,kν=1
(Uk1 ⊗ Uk2 · · · ⊗ Ukν ) (|ψx1〉〈ψx1 | ⊗ |ψx2〉〈ψx2 | · · · ⊗ |ψxν 〉〈ψxν |)
(
U†k1 ⊗ U
†
k2
· · · ⊗ U†kν
)
(A.5)
=
ν⊗
i=1
K∑
ki=1
Uki |ψxi〉〈ψxi |U†ki . (A.6)
This in particular implies
ρ¯
(ν)
E := EU [Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U †k] = ρ¯⊗νE , (A.7)
and therefore
c
(ν)
min := min
φ
〈φ|ρ¯(ν)E |φ〉 = min
φ
〈φ|ρ¯⊗νE |φ〉 = cνmin (A.8)
γ(ν) := max
φ
EU [|〈φ|Uk|ψx〉|4]
EU [|〈φ|Uk|ψx〉|2]2 . (A.9)
To bound γ(ν) we can first decompose a generic vector φ as |φ〉 = ∑i λi|φi〉, where {|φi〉}i is a basis of product vectors.
Then we apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality as described in Section and obtain (see Eq. (A.12):
γ(ν) ≤ 2γν . (A.10)
In conclusion, we can straightforwardly repeat the security proof of Section with this re-scaled parameter. This
yields that for any arbitrarily small  the bound
I(Xν ;Y ) ≤ 2 log 1
cνmin
, (A.11)
holds with almost unit probability provided that (recall that M ′ = δMν)
K(ν) > max
{
γν
[
512
3δ
dν
Mν
log
(
20
cνmin
)
+
64
2
log δMν
]
,
2 ln 2
2δ
log dν
Mνcνmin
}
. (A.12)
Finally, in the limit of ν  1 we obtain
1
ν
logK(ν) ' max
{
log γ + log
d
M
, log
1
Mcmin
}
. (A.13)
Appendix: Matrix Chernoff bounds
The matrix Chernoff bound states the following (this formulation can be obtained directly from Theorem 19 of Ref.
[38]):
Theorem 1 Let {Xt}t=1,...,T be T i.i.d. d-dimensional Hermitian-matrix-valued random variables, with Xt ∼ X,
0 ≤ X ≤ R, and cmin ≤ E[X] ≤ cmax. Then, for δ ≥ 0:
Pr
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xt 6≤ (1 + δ)E[X]
}
≤ d exp
{
−TD
[
(1 + δ)
cmin
R
∥∥∥cmin
R
]}
, (A.1)
where Pr{x} denotes the probability that the proposition x is true, and D[u‖v] = u ln (u/v)−(1−u) ln [(1− u)/(1− v)].
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Note that for δ > 1 we have
D
[
(1 + δ)
cmin
R
∥∥∥cmin
R
]
≥ δ
4
cmin
R
, (A.2)
and for δ < 1
D
[
(1 + δ)
cmin
R
∥∥∥cmin
R
]
≥ δ
2
4
cmin
R
. (A.3)
First consider the collection of M ′ code words ψx. We apply the Chernoff bound to the M ′ independent random
variables Xx = |ψx〉〈ψx|. Note that these operators are defined in a M -dimensional Hilbert space. For τ > 1 we then
have
Pr
 1M ′
M ′∑
x=1
|ψx〉〈ψx| 6≤ 1 + τ
M
 ≤M exp
(
−M
′τ
4M
)
. (A.4)
Consider now the collection of K random variables Xk =
1
M ′
∑
x Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U†k . We assume that they are bounded
by R = 1+τM . We apply again the Chernoff bound:
Pr
{
1
K
K∑
k=1
1
M ′
∑
x
Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U†k 6≤ (1 + )E[X]
}
≤ d exp
(
−MK
2cmin
4(1 + τ)
)
. (A.5)
Thus the total probability reads
p1 ≤M exp
(
−M
′τ
4M
)
+ d exp
(
−MK
2cmin
4(1 + τ)
)
(A.6)
≤M exp
(
−M
′τ
4M
)
+ d exp
(
−MK
2cmin
8τ
)
. (A.7)
Putting τ = M
√
Kcmin
2M ′ we obtain
p1 ≤ (M + d) exp
(
− 
4
√
M ′Kcmin
2
)
≤ 2d exp
(
− 
4
√
M ′Kcmin
2
)
. (A.8)
In conclusion we have obtained that, up to a probability smaller than p1,
1
KM ′
K∑
k=1
M ′∑
x=1
Uk|x〉〈x|U†k =
1
M ′
M ′∑
x=1
ρxE ≤ (1 + )ρ¯E . (A.9)
Appendix: The Maurer tail bound
We also need to apply the following concentration inequality due to A. Maurer [37]:
Theorem 2 Let {Xk}k=1,...,K be K i.i.d. non-negative real-valued random variables, with Xk ∼ X and finite first
and second moments, E[X],E[X2] <∞. Then, for any τ > 0 we have that
Pr
{
1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk < (1− τ)E[X]
}
≤ exp
(
−Kτ
2E[X]2
2E[X2]
)
. (A.1)
For any given x and φ, we apply this bound to the random variables
Xk ≡ |〈φ|Uk|ψx〉|2 . (A.2)
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Note that (see Section )
1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk = 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 , (A.3)
and
E[X] = 〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 . (A.4)
The application of the Maurer tail bound then yields
Pr {〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 < (1− τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉} ≤ exp
(
−Kτ
2
2γ
)
. (A.5)
where
γ = max
φ
EU [X2]
EU [X]2
= max
φ
EU [|〈φ|U |ψx〉|4]
〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉2 . (A.6)
Note that, by symmetry, γ is independent of ψx. The calculation of γ is presented in Sections and .
1. Extending to almost all code words
The probability bound in Eq. (A.5) is about one given value of x. Here we extend it to ` distinct values x1, x2, . . . , x`:
Pr {∀x = x1, x2, . . . x`, 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 < (1− τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉} ≤ exp
(
−`Kτ
2
2γ
)
, (A.7)
where we have used the fact that for different values of x the variables are statistically independent (recall that the
code words are chosen randomly and independently). Second, we extend to all possible choices of ` code words. This
amount to a total of
(
M ′
`
)
events. Applying the union bound we obtain
Pr {∃x1, x2, . . . x`, | ∀x = x1, x2, . . . x`, 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 < (1− τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉} ≤
(
M ′
`
)
exp
(
−`Kτ
2
2γ
)
. (A.8)
This implies that, up to a probability smaller than
(
M ′
`
)
exp
(
− `Kτ22γ
)
, 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 ≥ (1−τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 for at least M ′−`
values of x, which implies
1
M ′
M ′∑
x=1
〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 ≤
M ′ − `
M ′
(1− τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log [(1− τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉] . (A.9)
Putting ` = τM :
1
M
M ′∑
x=1
〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 ≤ (1− τ)2〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log [(1− τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉] (A.10)
≤ (1− τ)2〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 (A.11)
= (1− 2τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉+O(τ2) . (A.12)
2. Extending to all vectors φ
The final step is to extend the result to all unit vectors. This can be done by exploiting the notion of δ-net. A δ-net
is a discrete and finite set of vectors {φi} on the unit sphere such that for any unit vector φ there exists an element
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in the δ-net such that
‖φ− φi‖1 ≤ δ . (A.13)
It is known that there exist δ-nets with no more than (5/δ)2d elements [8], where d is the Hilbert space dimension.
We put δ = τcmin, therefore the size of the net is (5/τ/cmin)
2d. Applying the union bound on Eq. (A.8) we then
obtain
Pr {∀φ, ∃x1, x2, . . . x`, | ∀x = x1, x2, . . . x`, 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 < (1− 2τ)〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉} ≤
(
5
τcmin
)2d(
M ′
`
)
exp
(
−`Kτ
2
2γ
)
.
(A.14)
To conclude, we put  = 4τ and obtain that, uniformly in φ,
1
M
M ′∑
x=1
〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρxE |φ〉 ≤ (1− )〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ¯E |φ〉+O(2) . (A.15)
The probability that this bound is violated is smaller than (recall that ` = τM ′ = M ′/4)
p2 =
(
5
τcmin
)2d(
M ′
`
)
exp
(
−`Kτ
2
2γ
)
(A.16)
=
(
20
cmin
)2d(
M ′
M ′/4
)
exp
(
−KM
′3
128γ
)
(A.17)
≤
(
20
cmin
)2d
M ′M
′/4
exp
(
−KM
′3
128γ
)
. (A.18)
Appendix: Probability of the bad event
The above concentration inequalities allow us proving that the protocol is secure up a to certain probability. The
bad event that the protocol is not secure occurs when either Eq. (A.11) or (A.15) is violated. The probability of
the bad event is then smaller the sum of the corresponding probabilities, which are given in Eq. (A.8) and (A.18)
respectively. We therefore have
Pfail ≤ p1 + p2 ≤ 2d exp
(
− 
4
√
M ′Kcmin
2
)
+
(
20
cmin
)2d
M ′M
′/4
exp
(
−KM
′3
128γ
)
(A.1)
= exp
(
log 2d− 
4
√
M ′Kcmin
2
)
+ exp
[
2d log
(
20
cmin
)
+
M ′
4
logM ′ − KM
′3
128γ
]
. (A.2)
This probability is bounded away from 1 if
K >
32
2
1
M ′cmin
(log 2d)2 , (A.3)
and
K > 128γ
[
2
3
d
M ′
log
(
20
cmin
)
+
1
42
logM ′
]
. (A.4)
Appendix: Asymptotic speed of convergence
The goal of this section is to estimate the factor γ that determines the secret key consumption rate. First we
consider the regime of m n2 in which we can neglect photon bunching.
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The objective is therefore to evaluate the first and second moments of the random variable
X = |〈φ|U |ψj〉|2 , (A.1)
where φ restricted to be a vector in the single-occupancy subspace S1, which is our code space Hmn .
As a first step we compute the first and second moments of the random variable
X ′ = |〈ψj′ |U |ψj〉|2 . (A.2)
This is a little less general than (A.1) because ψj′ is not a generic vector in Hmn . In fact ψj and ψj′ identify two sets of
modes, with labels (i1, i2, . . . in) and (i
′
1, i
′
2, . . . i
′
n), respectively. This corresponds to photon-counting on the modes,
which as we know, maps onto n× n sub-matrix A(jj′) of the unitary matrix U :
A
(jj′)
hk := Uihi′k . (A.3)
The random variable X ′ is the modulus square of the permanent of A(jj
′):
X ′ = |〈ψj′ |U |ψj〉|2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
pi
n∏
h=1
A
(jj′)
hpi(h)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (A.4)
where the sum is over all the permutations pi.
To further explore the statistical properties of the permanent, it is useful to recall that a given entry of a random
m ×m unitary is itself distributed as a complex Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance 1/m. If instead we
consider a submatrix of size n × n the entries are with good approximation independent Gaussian variables as long
as n  m [11]. This means that the entries A(jj′)hk are distributed as n2 i.i.d. complex Gaussian variables with zero
mean and variance 1/m. Using this fact we can compute the first and second moments of X ′.
We exploit statistical independence and the fact that the forth moment of a Gaussian with variance 1/m is 2/m2.
X ′ =
∑
τ
n∏
j=1
a∗jτ(j)
×(∑
σ
n∏
i=1
aiσ(i)
)
=
∑
σ,τ
n∏
i,j=1
a∗jτ(j)aiσ(i) =
n!
mn
. (A.5)
since the non-zero terms are given by i = j, τ = σ.
From Lemma 56 of Ref. [11], the fourth moment of the permanent can be computed as
EU [X ′2] = EU [Perm[A]2Perm[A∗]2] =
n!(n+ 1)!
m2n
. (A.6)
In conclusion we have obtained
EU [X ′2]
EU [X ′]2
= n+ 1 . (A.7)
To extend to a generic vector φ in the single-occupancy subspace we first note that |φ〉 = ∑i λi|ψj〉. Then we apply
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality as shown in Section and obtain (see Eq. (A.12)):
γ ≤ 2(n+ 1) . (A.8)
Appendix: Speed of convergence in the finite-size regime
The goal of this section is to estimate the factor γ when m 6 n2. In this regime we cannot neglect photon bunching
and states with multiple occupancy need to be considered.
A generic state can be written as
|φ〉 =
∑
q,t
αq,t|φq,t〉 (A.1)
where q identifies a subspace with given photon occupancy pattern, and t labels the computational basis vectors
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(m,n) Photon pattern 2γq 2(n+ 1)
(6, 2) (1, 1, 0, . . . ) 3.770 6
(2, 0, . . . ) 4.314
(10, 2) (1, 1, . . . ) 4.256 6
(2, 0, . . . ) 5.136
(20, 2) (1, 1, 0, . . . ) 4.751 6
(2, 0, . . . ) 5.894
(10, 3) (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 4.562 8
(1, 2, 0, . . . ) 5.366
(3, 0, . . . ) 6.968
(20, 3) (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 5.482 8
(1, 2, 0, . . . ) 6.793
(3, 0, . . . ) 9.261
(20, 4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 5.427 10
(4, 0, . . . ) 13.466
TABLE II. The table shows numerically computed values of γq for different number of photons (n), modes (m), and photon
occupancy patterns. The table also shows the upper bound γ ≤ 2(n+ 1) which holds in the limit of n2  m.
within. For example, given two photons and three modes, q = 1 corresponds to the single-occupancy space S1 which
is generated by the computational basis vectors {|110〉, |101〉, |011〉}, and for q = 2 the double-occupancy space S2 is
generated by the computational basis vectors {|200〉, |020〉, |002〉}. For each value of q, |φq〉 is a vector in the linear
span of Sq.
We can now then apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality as discussed in Section . This yields (see Eq. (A.12)):
γ ≤ 2 max
q
EU [|〈φq|U |ψx〉|4]
EU [|〈φq|U |ψx〉|2]2 . (A.2)
By symmetry, the quantities
γq :=
EU [|〈φq|U |ψx〉|4]
EU [|〈φq|U |ψx〉|2]2 (A.3)
do depend on q but not on the particular vector φq in the subspace Sq, nor on the vector ψx. Therefore for each q,
γq can be computed numerically and in turn obtain an estimate for the upper bound on the speed of convergence
γ ≤ 2 max
q
γq . (A.4)
Examples are given in Table II. The Table suggests that the highest value of γq is achieved when all the photons
populate only one mode.
Appendix: Mutual information for a pure loss channel
For a lossy channel with transmissivity η, the mutual information I(A;B) = H(B) −H(B|A) between Alice and
Bob can be computed explicitly. We assume that Bob measures by photo-detection.
If Alice sends one particular code words ψj containing n photons, Bob will get k photons with probability p(k|j) =
ηk(1 − η)n−k. This is uniquely identified if Bob measures by photo-detection by k detection events. There exists
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Nk =
(
n
k
)
possible measurement outputs of this kind. Therefore the conditional entropy is
H(B|A) = −
∑
j
p(j)
∑
k
Nk p(k|j) log p(k|j) (A.1)
= −
∑
j
p(j)
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ηk(1− η)n−k log [ηk(1− η)n−k] (A.2)
= −
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ηk(1− η)n−k log [ηk(1− η)n−k] , (A.3)
where p(j) is the probability of code words ψj .
Now consider that Bob obtains a certain combination of k detection events over m modes. This output is compatible
with Mk =
(
m−k
n−k
)
input code words sent by Alice. As the total number of code words is M =
(
m
n
)
, the probability of
obtaining a given combination of k detection is
p(k) =
Mk
M
p(k|j) =
(
m−k
n−k
)(
m
n
) ηk(1− η)n−k . (A.4)
Note that the total number of possible outputs is N ′k =
(
m
k
)
, therefore we have
H(B) = −
n∑
k=0
N ′kp(k) log p(k) (A.5)
= −
n∑
k=0
(
m
k
)(m−k
n−k
)(
m
n
) ηk(1− η)n−k log [(m−kn−k)(m
n
) ηk(1− η)n−k] (A.6)
= −
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ηk(1− η)n−k log
[(
m−k
n−k
)(
m
n
) ηk(1− η)n−k] . (A.7)
Finally we obtain:
I(A;B) = −
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ηk(1− η)n−k log
(
m−k
n−k
)(
m
n
) (A.8)
= log
(
m
n
)
−
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ηk(1− η)n−k log
(
m− k
n− k
)
. (A.9)
With the mutual information we can write the asymptotic rate
r = βI(A;B)− log (n+ 1)− log d
M
, (A.10)
where β is the error correction efficiency. An example of net transmission rate is given in Fig. 4. The plot includes
finite size effects.
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FIG. 4. Net number of bits transmitted per channel use in the presence of loss. The parameters are β = 0.95, δ = 0.01,
m,n = 20, 3 and  = exp(−νs ln 2), s = 0.43, where ν is the number of channel use. The shaded region is a guide to the eye
only, and data points above the region denotes net positive secret communication rate.
